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Review Feature
Abracadabra! Early Hominin for ‘I think 
my humming’s out of tune with the rest of 
the world!’
Maggie Tallerman
One of the major tenets of this book is that Early Hu-
mans communicated — at least as long ago as 1.8 myr 
— by using a system that Mithen terms ‘Hmmmmm’, 
standing for Holistic, manipulative, multi-modal, 
musical and mimetic. Mithen’s big idea is that there 
was ‘a single precursor for both music and language’ 
(p. 26), a communication system rather like a musical 
score, but comprising holistic vocalizations, hand and 
body gestures, mimesis, even song and dance. All of 
these features combine to what other people might 
call protolanguage, or pre-language.
But Mithen, as a non-linguist, has seized rather 
too eagerly on a lovely, simple idea: since the vocaliza-
tions of other primates are ‘holistic’ (not decomposable 
into any component parts, having nothing analogous 
to words or morphemes) then the earliest language-
like hominin utterances must similarly have been 
holistic. Lovely, but to most linguists, clearly wrong. 
Mithen gives as an example of the possible content 
of a single holistic utterance ‘Go and hunt the hare I 
saw five minutes ago behind the stone at the top of 
the hill’ (p. 172).
Let’s get this straight: we are talking about an 
era long before there’s any syntax or clauses, nor (in 
Mithen’s view) any words, so all of this hare story is 
supposedly represented by one utterance, perhaps 
supplemented by gestures or a tune. As Mithen puts 
it (p. 172) ‘Each phrase would have been an indivisible 
unit that had to be learned, uttered and understood 
as a single acoustic sequence’. Problem number one: 
each utterance also has to be stored as a single concept 
in the hominin’s mental lexicon, and retrieved from 
storage to be uttered. Now, it cannot conceivably be 
the case that the lexicon at any stage prior to the emer-
gence of fully modern humans was more complex than 
it is today, yet nothing remotely as complex is stored 
as a single concept in any known languages. Mithen’s 
‘hare’ example is the conceptual equivalent of no less 
than three clauses. But modern speakers have been 
shown to engage in conceptual planning only at the 
level of a single clause — a mental proposition. So 
how could early hominins possibly have had the 
lexical capacity to store, retrieve and execute a single 
utterance which corresponds to several clauses’ worth 
of semantic content? And if they could, why has this 
amazing capacity been lost?
Problem number two: like all linguistic or proto-
linguistic communication, holistic utterances must 
be culturally transmitted; in other words, they are 
unlike ape calls, which are essentially innate. So how 
did anyone ever learn the highly specific meanings 
that Mithen attributes to his holistic utterances? The 
idea that any bunch of hominins (then or now) could 
even agree on the meanings of a set of these hugely 
complex utterances, let alone learn them, just doesn’t 
square with what we know about the brain. Mithen 
argues that Neanderthal children (amongst other 
hominins) could have acquired ‘a large number of 
holistic phrases’ (p. 241), but fails to address the fact 
that this is a far harder task than learning a set of proto-
words, where one word equals — and can be stored 
and retrieved as — a single lexical concept.
Problem number three. Assume with Mithen that 
words ultimately emerge from longer holistic utter-
ances when chance similarities occur in the phonetic 
strings, and can be imbued with similar meanings. 
He gives an example of Alison Wray’s: if a phrase 
tebima meant ‘give that to her’ and a phrase kumapi 
meant ‘share this with her’, then ‘an individual might 
recognize that ma was a common phonetic segment 
in both phrases, and “her” a common aspect of their 
meaning’ (p. 253). An obvious objection is that this is 
not at all how the development of pronouns and other 
function words proceeds: it is axiomatic in linguistics 
that they emerge from content words via well under-
stood processes of grammaticalization (basically, this 
means losing lexical content and becoming merely 
grammatical). This aside, the major drawback with 
the proposal is that our hominins are supposed to be 
able to extract the common bit of sound/meaning no 
matter where the string ma occurs in the utterance (and 
presumably, that might be somewhere in the middle 
of a much longer string, such as bupakagulodimaladop-
ubogo — after all, Mithen does note that ‘the holistic 
phrases [...] of our human ancestors may have been 
of considerable length, having evolved over millenia 
and proliferated in number to provide ever greater 
semantic specificity’: p. 254).
Why is the idea of such an ability a problem? Be-
cause once again, nothing remotely like it occurs in any 
known language in linguistically sophisticated Homo 
sapiens. In languages with agglutinating or polysyn-
thetic morphology, each word contains a lexical stem 
which is preceded and followed by a number of other 
bound (inseparable, non-independent) morphemes; a 
single utterance may be very long, corresponding to an 
entire clause in a language like English. But the order 
of elements within words is fixed: each morpheme 
is allocated a position in a morphemic template, which 
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specifies an exact order for each verb or noun stem, 
and all the other classes of morphemes attached to it. 
We never find random ordering of chunks of meaning: 
this simply wouldn’t be learnable. So Mithen’s poor 
hominins, struggling towards Language, evidently 
possess superhuman analytical capabilities.
So far, then, we have seen that the nice, straight-
forward idea of holistic pre-language must be wrong, 
because at all levels (lexical storage, lexical access, 
lexical acquisition, speech processing) it requires lin-
guistic abilities far beyond those of modern humans. 
(A number of other detailed arguments in this vein 
are outlined in Tallerman in press.)
Why, then, do proponents of holistic proto-
language like the idea? A big part of it, for Mithen at 
least, is because ‘a holistic protolanguage of this type is 
evidently on an evolutionary continuity with ape-like 
vocalizations’ (p. 149). The point is presumably that 
the more continuity we envisage between pre-hominin 
vocalizations and early hominin utterances, the less 
we have to explain about how Language emerged. I 
had thought that as a polarized debate, this had long 
gone extinct. Apparently not. Mithen seems to think 
that opponents of holistic protolanguage are just 
against the idea of continuity per se (p. 149). But this 
isn’t the case. It is rather clear, for instance, that the 
motor function of speech ‘draws on phylogenetically 
ancient mammalian oral capacities for sucking, lick-
ing, swallowing and chewing’ (Studdert-Kennedy & 
Goldstein 2003, 239). From such actions, these authors 
suggest, comes the hominin protosyllable — and I am 
pleased to concur. At a basic level, it’s obvious that 
the common ancestor of chimp and human at around 
5–6 mya had a vocal tract, tongue and lips and glottis, 
ears, and much else besides that we’ve now co-opted 
for speaking and listening. But speech (production, 
perception, even neural mechanisms supporting) is 
not language, as Mithen himself concedes in a footnote 
(19, p. 312).
Moreover, there are a number of serious ways 
in which primate vocalization differs from language. 
Mithen even lists some of these (a subset of the points 
mentioned in Tallerman in press); see note 18, p. 312. 
But then he straightaway dismisses them. Doesn’t it 
matter that different neuroanatomical structures are 
responsible for language than for primate vocaliza-
tion; that in the main, primate vocalization is not 
under voluntary control; that primate calls are made 
on both the inbreath and the outbreath, whereas 
language vocalizations are made on the outbreath; 
that primate calls are essentially genetically transmit-
ted (innate) while the vocalizations of language are 
learned? Most of all, doesn’t it matter that primate 
calls differ radically from linguistic utterances in 
that the latter, and only the latter, dissociate sound 
and meaning? Only in Language do we see the finite 
set of speech sounds combined and re-combined to 
make up the infinite set of meanings that humans can 
conceptualize. This stuff is not trivia, and Language 
is not just a few easy steps away from the ancestral 
call system, which is how I think Mithen would like 
to portray things.
Still on continuity, Mithen actually underestimates 
the communicative importance of ‘gesture-calls’ (Burl-
ing 2005): non-linguistic and paralinguistic gestures 
and signals such as laughter, sobs, screams, frowns, 
smiles, snarls, shrugs and many more, all of which 
share crucial characteristics with the communica-
tion systems of other primates. Mithen assumes that 
Hmmmmm includes these features, and I wholeheart-
edly agree that they are essential to human commu-
nication. Where Mithen and I part company is over 
the need to postulate an additional layer of vocal-
ized ‘holistic utterances’, primarily concerned with 
the manipulation of other individuals. He regards 
these as crucial for ‘the type of subtle and sensitive 
communication that is required for the development 
and maintenance of social relationships’ (p. 148). But 
why? We don’t need holistic utterances in order to 
convey our feelings — this is exactly what gesture-
calls do. Protolanguage (or, indeed, Language) of any 
kind barely even enhances — and certainly doesn’t 
usurp — the role of the ancient non-verbal features in 
maintaining social relationships. Postulating a holistic 
protolanguage to do the social stuff is then an unneces-
sary evolutionary digression, and one from which we 
would have to backtrack to get words. Mithen leads 
us down a blind alley, and at the end we’re no nearer 
to the origins of language.
In sum, a great bedtime read — but only for those 
who enjoy fiction. 
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